Will a Typo Shut Down Your Agency?

by Tim Rowan, Editor Emeritus

This is the first of a multi-part, investigative report about fraud, waste, and abuse at the federal level, not the “bad actors” currently under investigation.

There was just one problem. Ownership had not changed since June 2019, as the PECOS enrollment record proved. On November 24 and 25, 2025, the hospice’s authorized officials sent NGS (their Medicare Administrative Contractor) clearly stated emails with an organizational chart attached. It showed that, as of July 13, 2026, official ownership records established in 2019 remained unchanged.

Even more telling: A CMS representative personally instructed the agency to write “Not a new agency” with its established date on the cover sheets of every Additional Documentation Request (ADR) form returned to NGS. NGS’s own auditors received forms bearing that exact, handwritten notation.

NGS received the message…and ignored it.

The consultant working with the Arizona hospice explained, “PPEO exists for one narrow purpose: enhanced prepayment review of claims from genuinely new providers, or those with qualifying ownership changes. It is not a post-payment cudgel to be applied retroactively to an established hospice’s existing charts to manufacture a “pattern or practice of abusive billing” under 42 C.F.R. § 424.535(a)(8).”

NGS abandoned what the record suggests was a far more robust 54-chart review and instead conducted a lightning-fast, 10-chart PPEO “snapshot” over a mere 30-day period. Next, they denied eight claims, on a Post-payment rather than the PPEO standard Pre-payment review, looking back four months to November 2025. The denied claims totaled $54,568.42.

• “missing” addendum forms, which are not required
• hyper-technical formatting nitpicks
• outright misrepresentations of the hospice’s medical record.

The consultant did not fail to notice NGS’s deceptions. Still falsely claiming there was a change of ownership, the MAC selected claims from a previous month before the non-existent ownership change.

Each of the eight patients had valid election statements. Addenda were either timely furnished via DocuSign (with irrefutable certificates of completion) or expressly declined by the beneficiary on the election form itself. Physician Certifications of Terminal Illness contained detailed narratives tying primary diagnoses — end-stage heart failure (NYHA Class IV), sarcopenia, senile degeneration of brain, end-stage MDS, advanced COPD — to synergistic comorbidities.

Objective prognostic indicators far exceeded LCD L33393 thresholds: PPS scores of 40–50%, 5/6 to 6/6 ADL dependence, MUAC measurements of 22–27 cm confirming severe malnutrition, serial weight loss, FAST progression to stage 6e–7A, incontinence, recurrent infections, oxygen or transfusion dependence (hemoglobin as low as 5).

In at least two cases, the beneficiary died within days or weeks of the service period — one during the benefit period itself, another just 37 days later. This is not “abusive billing.” This is hospice care for patients whose prognoses were tragically accurate.

Yet NGS’s initial denials were bare codes (commonly 55H1L or similar) with zero explanation — violating the regulatory requirement that determinations be written so a beneficiary can understand the reasons. At redetermination, new and contradictory theories emerged: one claim denied after NGS invented a “151-pound weight loss” when the chart showed a radically different number of pounds; another claimed “good appetite” while records documented clear decline.

These shifting rationales, and the refusal to engage the provider’s detailed page-by-page roadmaps mapping every regulatory element to the actual medical record pages, directly violate MLN Matters SE1521 and 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.921, 405.956, and 405.976.

This case is not unique but is representative of the dilemma Medicare providers have faced since the early years of this century. The OIG has already issued reports documenting NGS’s systemic failures. Inspectors reopen cost reports after finding “obvious errors” by NGS, They have uncovered hundreds of thousands in net overpayment accusations, as well as 100% error rates in some desk-reviewed cost reports.

It does not speak well of the entire Medicare program that a contractor this error-prone in its accounting work was somehow trusted to make life-or-death clinical judgments and ownership determinations. Worse, the Milwaukee-based insurance company with the MAC contract rarely admits errors but instead doubles down, aggressively pursuing termination when caught in the act.

When the consultant fighting for the hospice could not shake loose satisfactory responses from NGS, he escalated. He managed to arrange a video conference with member of Dr. Oz’s staff. The conversation centered around hundreds of pages of documented contractor misconduct, including the “Not a new agency” notations NGS itself had accepted. Their response?

The case has now moved beyond Maximus QIC reconsideration. A master supplemental submission was filed this week (July 13–14, 2026) demanding reversal of all eight denials and a declaration that the PPEO was unlawful from day one. Protective ALJ hearings have been filed. A DAB appeal on the related enrollment revocation is pending. Federal court is the next stop if necessary.

This entire 2025-26 incident does not signal new behavior, but has been going on nearly 20 years. It is the exact pattern the Medicare Appeals Council condemned in Quality Home Health Services, Inc. v. Trust Solutions, LLC (DAB, Sept. 14, 2009) — a case in which NGS itself was the intermediary whose “very brief and conclusory,” “stock phrase,” non-individualized denials were rejected wholesale.

As this is written, the Arizona hospice’s saga progresses toward a federal trial or a pre-trial settlement. We will stay on top of developments for future reports.

Administrator Oz, and the HHS OIG, may respond to NGS behavior by initiating measures to curb contractor fraud, or he may continue to stand before TV cameras to keep his focus on bad actors on the provider side. Neither consultants nor the press hold the power to influence CMS one way or the other.

That will be up to the provider community. It will be up to you, dear reader. If anything like the Arizona experience happened to your agency at the hands of your MAC, please tell us. We will share your stories, anonymously if requested. The more stories we can deliver about insurance companies with CMS contracts that engage in lawbreaking, the more difficult it will be for top officials to ignore it. The most powerful evidence is first-person stories about improper MAC determinations that result in harm to a patient. Send your stories to editor@therowanreport.com.

We are still receiving additional information on this breaking news story. We are communicating with the consultant involved and will have more information next week. Some of what we have learned game changing. Stay tuned.

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Tim Rowan is a 30-year home care technology consultant who co-founded and served as Editor and principal writer of this publication for 25 years. He continues to occasionally contribute news and analysis articles under The Rowan Report’s new ownership. He is also the creator of the new “Home Care Technology Buyer’s Guide,” which will be released in the 4th quarter this year. More information: RowanResources.com
Tim@RowanResources.com

©2026 by The Rowan Report, Peoria, AZ. All rights reserved. This article originally appeared in The Rowan Report. One copy may be printed for personal use: further reproduction by permission only. editor@therowanreport.com